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Abstract 
 
Waves of successive Devolution Deals are transforming ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ landscape of 
spatial governance and transferring new powers to city-regions, facilitating fundamental 
qualitative policy reconfigurations and opening up new opportunities as well as new risks 
for citizens and local areas. Focused on city-ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐƌŽůĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚ
employment support policies the article advances in four ways what are currently 
conceptually and geographically underdeveloped literatures on employment support 
accountability levers. Firstly, the paper dissects weaknesses in the accountability framework 
ŽĨ'ƌĞĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ key national contracted-out employment support programme and 
identifies the potential for city-regions to respond to these weaknesses. Secondly, the 
article highlights the centrality of the nationally neglected network accountability lever in 
supporting these unemployed individuals and advances this discussion further by 
introducing to the literature for the first time a conceptual distinction between what we 
term  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨthese accountably levels that currently remain 
homogenized within the literature. Crucially, the argument sets out for the first time in the 
literature why analytically it is the positive version of network accountability that is the key 
 W and currently missing at national-level  W ingredient to the design of effective employment 
support for the priority group of  ‘ŚĂƌĚĞƌ-to-ŚĞůƉ ?unemployed people who have more 
complex and/or severe barriers to employment. Thirdly, the paper argues from a 
geographical perspective that it is city-regions that are uniquely positioned in the English 
context to create the type of positively networked integrated employment support 
 ‘ĞĐŽƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚĂƌĚĞƌ-to-ŚĞůƉ ? individuals in particular require. Finally, the discussion 
situates these city-region schemes within their broader socio-economic and political context 
and connects with broader debates around the lurching development of neoliberalism (Peck 
and Theodore, 2012). In doing so it argues that whilst these emerging city-region ecosystem 
models offer much progressive potential their relationship to the problematic neoliberal 
employment support paradigm remains uncertain given that they refine, embed and indeed 
buttress that same neoliberal employment policy paradigm rather than fundamentally 
challenging or stepping beyond it. 
 
Keywords: devolution; employment support; welfare-to-work; accountability; city-
regions. 
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Multiple and on-going waves of decentralisation are repositioning city-regions  W 
combinations of contiguous local authority government areas  W as key new scales of 
government in the English context ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽŽƚƐƚĞƉƐŽĨ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐŶŽw long-
standing mayoral powers, ƌŝĚŝŶŐŚŝŐŚŽŶƚŚĞďĂĐŬŽĨ ‘ĞǀŽ DĂŶĐ ?ŝŶ'ƌĞĂƚĞƌDĂŶĐŚĞƐƚĞƌ ?
and situated in the broader political context of devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, devolution has been close to the top of the h< ?Ɛ political agenda since 
2010, pushed from the top by former Chancellor George Osborne and grasped from below 
by city-regions themselves. Driven by opaque political negotiation, a geographical 
patchwork of ǀĂƌǇŝŶŐ ‘deals ? has emerged ĂĐƌŽƐƐŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŝƚǇ-regions in which variable 
sets of powers and resources have grown  W and with generated momentum continue to 
grow  W iteratively and unevenly across the country. This has created new opportunities for 
the reconfiguration, integration and alignment of local systems and budgets as well as 
opening up new risks around the creation of new types and sources of spatial variation and 
the decentralization of new responsibilities and accountabilities in the context of 
significantly reduced local budgets due to central government commitment to continued 
austerity.  
This Treasury-fuelled devolutionary zeal has been variably embraced by different 
central government departments and uncertain governance relationships between national 
government and city-regions have become the norm (Tomaney et al., 2013; Pike et al., 
2015). Hence, whilst planning, skills, transport, housing and economic development have 
been centre-stage in these scalar shifts, responsibilities over employment support for the 
unemployed has until recently remained out of bounds for city-regions in the face of a 
highly centrist national Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). However, amidst 
persistently disappointing provision and outcomes performance for  ‘ŚĂƌĚĞƌ-to-ŚĞůƉ ? 
participants  W understood as those unemployed individuals with multiple and/or severe 
barriers to work  W within large national quasi-marketized contracted-out provision, and an 
increasing recognition that the status quo cannot continue amidst the ever-tightening fiscal 
squeeze of austerity, ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?ƐĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇŵŽŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĐŽŵĞ ? 
Although still uncertain within the on-going realpolitik of central-local negotiations, 
there is underway in key urban city-regions the beginnings of a step-change in the spatial 
governance of traditionally centrist employment support policy, bringing the country closer 
to the multi-scalar and multi-agency governance arrangements of activation seen more 
usually across the OECD (van Berkel et al., 2011; Minas et al., 2012). This rescaling or, more 
accurately, multi-ƐĐĂůŝŶŐŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛemployment support landscape opens up genuine new 
possibilities for substantive transformation towards a markedly more effective and 
progressive city-region model of employment support than is seen nationally either within 
the ultra-lean public employment service (Jobcentre Plus) or large scale quasi-marketized 
and contracted-ŽƵƚƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƚŚĞ ‘tŽƌŬWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ?. Whilst in principle beneficial to 
all unemployed individuals, this city-region rescaling offers particular transformative 
potential for individuals with more complex and/or severe barriers to employment given 
that the national system  W whether through Jobcentre Plus or contracted-out provision  W 
has amply demonstrated that it lacks the resources, integration and governance frameworks 
to deliver.  
Demands for the localisation of employment support from the national DWP 
monopoly down to a local city-region model have been vocal, determined, and largely from 
beyond the academy (IPPR, 2014; Centre for Cities, 2014; CCIN, 2015; ResPublica, 2015; 
LGA, 2015a; WPSC, 2015). Hence, despite the existence of related academic literatures 
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ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ‘ůŽĐĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĞǁƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?(Lovering, 1999; Cooke, 2006; Jones and Woods, 
2013) ?ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƐƐĞŵďůĂŐĞƐ ? (Amin et al., 2003; Allen and Cochrane, 
2007; Jonas, 2012), city-region governance (Storper, 2014) and, indeed, city-region 
metagovernance (Jessop, 2008, 2011; Etherington and Jones, 2016), the significant 
conceptual, geographical and policy implications of these scalar shifts in employment 
support have to date not been subjected to critical scholarly reflection. This is the task to 
which this article for the first time responds. 
The remainder of the article is structured around four key contributions to the 
currently conceptually and geographically underdeveloped literature on employment 
support accountability levers. After briefly tracing the recent UK history of the localism 
agenda and the laggard, but now emerging, area of employment support within this 
devolutionary landscape, the discussion firstly dissects weaknesses in the accountability 
framework of 'ƌĞĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?tĂůĞƐ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ? key national contracted-out 
employment support programme and identifies the identifies the potential for city-regions 
to respond to these weaknesses. Secondly, the argument highlights the centrality of the 
network accountability lever in supporting these participants (despite policy-ŵĂŬĞƌƐ ?
obsessions with market-based accountability levers in such schemes) and advances further 
both by introducing for the first time a conceptual distinction between what we term 
 ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůǇůĞǀĞůƐƚŚĂƚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƌĞŵĂŝŶ
homogenized within the literature. Crucially, the argument sets out why it is the positive 
version of network accountability that is the key  W and currently missing at national-level  W 
ingredient to the design of effective employment support for the priority group of 
unemployed people with more complex and/or severe barriers to employment, in contrast 
ƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬǀŝƐŝŽŶseen within the national contracted-out Work 
Programme for this group. Thirdly, the significant geographical implications of the 
discussion are drawn out in terms of identifying the unique potential of city-regions to 
provide this type of positively networked employment support ecosystem. And finally, the 
discussion situates these city-region schemes within their broader socio-economic and 
political context and connects with broader debates around the lurching development of 
neoliberalism (Peck and Theodore, 2012). In doing so it argues that whilst these emerging 
city-region ecosystem models offer much progressive potential, their relationship to the 
problematic neoliberal employment support paradigm to which they respond remains 
uncertain given that they may refine, embed and indeed buttress that same neoliberal 
employment policy paradigm rather than fundamentally challenging or stepping beyond it.  
 
 
 Negotiated localism and the glimpse of employment support 
 
If the UK can overall be described in comparative terms as a highly centralised 
political system then this caricature underplays the extent to which trends in central, 
regional and local powers and responsibilities have waxed and waned over the last century 
(NAO, 2014). Sitting in the broader context of processes of devolution to Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales, following the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government in the 2010 general election the 2010 Local Growth Act, 2011 Localism Act and 
ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚǁĂǀĞƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ‘ĞĂůƐ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚEnglish 
city-regions  W City Deals, Growth Deals and Devolution Deals  W have reconfigured the nature 
of spatial governance across England. Whilst regions (e.g. Regional Development Agencies) 
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and localities (e.g. New Deal for Communities) have been the scales of interest in recent UK 
employment and regeneration activity, the current devolutionary iteration follows the US 
ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ‘ŵĞƚƌŽ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘city-regionƐ ? Wformalised collaborations 
of multiple constituent local authorities that are usually (but not always!) contiguous and 
that together offer the necessary promise  W though not always in reality (Pugalis and 
Townsend, 2014)  W of the political, economic and social coherence and scale required to 
fulfil their strategic economic growth objectives. 
At the heart of these shifts has been the replacement across England of large 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) with the still evolving and uneasy smaller city-region 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEP) governance landscape, which has, in the words of Vince 
Cable, the former Secretary of State heading the responsible central government 
department for Business, Innovation and Skills ?ďĞĞŶ “ĂůŝƚƚůĞDĂŽŝƐƚĂŶĚĐŚĂŽƚŝĐ ? ?ĂďůĞ ?
quoted in Stratton, 2010:1). Created in 2011, LEPs are business-led bodies with local 
authority representation that have been established at this city-region scale as they key 
strategic players to drive through local economic growth. To achieve its economic objectives 
business-led LEPs work in conjunction with political Combined Authorities (CAs) that offer a 
new layer of city-regional political governance with its own leadership, staff and functions 
and that incorporate into its governance structure the Chief Executives of the multiple 
(usually 6-10) constituent Local Authorities within its boundaries.   
CAs vary widely in their make-up, activities and ambitions, a reflection in part of their 
spatially sandwiched position between central government above and constituent local 
authorities below and the political reality that the space that CAs are enabled to fill shrinks 
and expands according to negotiations with these key stakeholders in both directions. 
Pertinent to the present argument are the city-regions of the larger urban cores  W London, 
Greater Manchester, Sheffield City Region, West Midlands, Liverpool City Region, and so on 
 W who are powering ahead in terms of their devolutionary ambition and journey. Despite 
this continually shifting patchwork quilt of differing city-region powers, common city-region 
responsibilities exist around economic development, planning, housing, transport and skills. 
Although intimately intertwined with these devolving policy areas, employment support for 
the unemployed has remained largely out of scope for city-regions, a reflection both of the 
strong centrist tendencies of the national DWP as well as the nationally dominated policy 
landscape of public employment service Jobcentre Plus provision and the national quasi-
marketized and contracted-out provision. In the leading urban city-regions, however, 
employment support is now too being dragged squarely onto the devolutionary negotiation 
table, with significant transformative potential resulting for its qualitative reconfiguration 
around better integrated support and, as a consequence, improved experiences and 
outcomes for unemployed individuals. 
Key to that national DWP employment support offer is the contracted-out Work 
Programme scheme for the long-term unemployed and it is this scheme that has become 
the benchmark and touchstone for select city-regions ?ĞŶƚƌŝĞƐ into the employment support 
landscape. Implemented in 2011, Work Programme is a large scale quasi-marketized 
programme that has worked with around 2 million unemployed individuals since 2011 at a 
total cost of around £3-4 billion. Work Programme is structured geographically into 18 large 
regional Contract Package Areas (CPAs) across England, Scotland and Wales each containing 
two or three large and well-ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝǌĞĚ ‘ƉƌŝŵĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?ƚŽǁŚŽŵƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ are randomly 
allocated after an initial period of Jobcentre Plus provision (usually following nine to twelve 
months of unemployment). Primes can both deliver services themselves and/or sub-
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contract to organisations within their supply chains. With a  ‘ďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĞ
programme furnishes providers with almost complete flexibility over the type and frequency 
of support for participants. Outcomes rather than process is the key interest and at the 
heart of the scheme is a strong payment-by-results (PbR) model that is heavily weighted 
(and since 2014 entirely weighted) towards paying only for sustained job outcomes. Work 
Programme is not targeted on particular groups of unemployed people and, in recognition 
of the enormous variability in its participants, payment levels vary across nine payment 
groups to which individuals are allocated according to a crude notion of their relative 
distance from the labour market based on benefit type  W either :ŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?ƐůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ ?:^ ?
or Employment Support Allowance (ESA) where claimants have officially acknowledged 
disabilities.  
Somewhat ironically given its centralising credentials, it is Work Programme itself 
that has laid the groundwork for localising activation pressures due to its disappointing 
performance for participants with more complex and/or severe support needs in particular. 
Weaknesses within the programme ?s accountability framework (discussed below) have left 
the scheme susceptible to the under-resourcing, poor performance ĂŶĚ ‘ƉĂƌŬŝŶŐ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?
absolute or relative neglect) of participants considered unlikely to (inexpensively and/or 
securely) achieve payable job outcomes for providers.  The main ESA claimant group has for 
example seen only 7% of claimants achieving a job outcome (measured as sustained work of 
three months) within a year of referral (DWP, 2015a). Nor do participantƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
Work Programme inspire confidence, with basic and generic provision the norm and 
ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐ ‘ƉĂƌŬŝŶŐ ?ŽĨharder-to-help participants (Newton et al., 2012; 
Lane et al., 2013; Meager et al., 2013; Rees et al., 2013). 
Sitting within this context of disappointing Work Programme experiences and 
performance for harder-to-help participants, the calls for greater city-region involvement in 
employment support have been vocal, unrelenting and impossible for the DWP to ignore 
(IPPR, 2014; Centre for Cities, 2014; CCIN, 2015; ResPublica, 2015; LGA, 2015a; WPSC, 2015). 
Building on momentum created by local pilot programmes in Greater Manchester (Working 
Well), central London (Working Capital) and Glasgow and the Clyde Valley (Working 
Matters), employment support powers were a notable feature within the latest round of 
Autumn 2015 Devolution Deals for several of the larger, more urbanised city-region 
frontrunners across England. Two employment items within these deals are of particular 
relevance: firstly, the ability for further integrated employment support city-region pilot 
programmes in other city-region areas; and, secondly, co-design/co-commissioning of the 
upcoming Work and Health Programme. This programme will from late 2017 replace Work 
Programme and the smaller Work Choice (a scheme intended for, but poorly targeted on, 
individuals with more severe health conditions and disabilities) ĂƐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŵĂŝŶƋƵĂƐŝ-
marketized and contracted-out employment support programme, though with only a 
fraction of the budget of its forerunners (DWP, 2015b).  
An embryonic yet radical set of shifts in the scale, qualitative configuration and 
quantitative performance potential of employment support are therefore underway in the 
more urbanised city-region areas across ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ĂƚƌĞŶĚƐƵƌĞƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĂƐtW ?Ɛ
devolutionary inertia is gradually chipped away at and as these city-ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐĂǁĂŝƚƚŚĞ
imminent arrival of elected mayors with new powers, ambitions and public mandates. At 
the heart of the change is the vision from city-regions of the progressive creation of locally 
integrated employment support  ‘ecosystems ? that strategically and operationally align and 
coordinate a range of what are currently siloed and disconnected key wraparound support 
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services and budgets. These supports need to be brought together and marshalled in order 
to enable the delivery of whole-person holistic keyworker support packages encompassing 
ƚŚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŶĞĞĚƐ  W personalised employment advice, skills, health, 
housing, financial advice, family support, etc. This qualitatively reconfigured locally 
integrated ecosystem model of employment support that city-region rescaling allows brings 
with it transformative quantitative potential for significant performance uplift and system 
savings (both centrally and locally), particularly in relation to unemployed individuals with 
more complex and/or severe barriers to employment. 
These intertwined shifts between the geographical scale of employment support, 
accountability levers, and programme nature and performance remain absent from critical 
scrutiny within the academic literature however, despite their importance both for our 
understanding of shifting patterns of spatial governance as well as the linked conceptual 
and geographical nature of employment support accountability levers. The next section 
begins this discussion by considering the nature of the existing accountability mechanisms 
running through the national contracted-out Work Programme scheme from which the 
emerging city-region ecosystem models flow and to whose failings they respond.  
 
Accountability weaknesses in the UK Work Programme: opportunities for city-regions 
 
 To unpick city-ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ĞŶƚƌǇƉŽŝŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚtŽƌŬWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ
employment support policy arena, the analytical framework of accountability mechanisms 
to understand the design and performance of employment support programmes is a 
powerful approach, but one that remains conceptually as well as geographically 
underdeveloped at present. Building on the broader employment support governance 
literature (Considine, 2001; Newman, 2001), as well as that limited literature which does 
focus specifically on accountability mechanisms in employment support (Jantz et al, 2015), 
five heuristic approaches to understanding accountability mechanisms within the field of 
employment support are identifiable  W procedural, corporate, market, network and 
democratic. These can be summarised as follows:  
x Procedural accountability draws on rule-based principles and norms of reliability and 
procedural fairness where public servants follow set processes, rules and 
requirements; 
x Corporate accountability utilises contractualised performance targets to monitor and 
compare provider performance so as to reward or punish providers accordingly (e.g. 
contract renewals/terminations, additional/reduced referrals or payments); 
x Market accountability steers using levers of price and competition between 
providers. The provision of contracted-out employment activation schemes is 
equated with  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?ĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŽĨĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚĞĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĐŽŶŵŝĐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĞǀĞŶ
if such schemes are in many ways, and with key implications, artificial quasi-
marketized creations. PbR, accelerator pricing, or other financial 
incentives/sanctions for good/bad performance typify market accountability levers; 
x Democratic accountability responds transparently to the views of citizens and users. 
Whilst Jantz et al (2015) focus  ‘top-down ? on the accountability of politicians though 
the electoral cycle, we would also include ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ‘bottom-up ? democratic 
accountability levers to user ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǀŝĂůĞǀĞƌƐŽĨ ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬ ?
complaints, ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌĂŶĚ ?ŽƌŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
and exit) to drive service quality (Hirschman, 1970). 
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x Network accountability coordinates provision across multiple, inter-dependent 
service providers using relationships based on trust. Softer informal levers around 
the collective need for organisations to protect reputations and foster on-going 
relationships of co-operation and co-dependence offer informal and collectively-
enforced network accountability mechanisms (Olson, 1965).  
 
Although Work Programme on paper incorporates elements from each of these five 
accountability types, it is in practice imbalanced and undermined by its disproportionate 
reliance on the market-based PbR lever. The programme is also partial in the sense that it is 
dependent on what we below describe as  ‘negative ? defensive versions of these 
accountability levers, and problematic in its weak operationalisation of several of those 
already ƉĂƌƚŝĂů ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? accountability visions. The consequences for programme 
performance, for participants, and for taxpayer value-for-money have been predictably 
disappointing from the outset, though the lack of any robust impact evaluation makes it 
difficult to establish quantitatively the full scale of these weaknesses. 
 Procedural and democratic accountability mechanisms play a relatively insignificant 
role in practice within Work Programme. Procedurally, minimum service guarantees (MSGs) 
were submitted to the DWP by prime providers in tender documents and make promises 
around the frequency, type and quality of employment support to be offered to participants 
within their contract. These MSGs suffer however from their wide variability and frequent 
vagueness which hinders their standardisation, clarity and sometimes enforceability. There 
is also considerable variability in the communication of MSGs to participants such that 
programme participants are routinely not aware of the type of support they ought to 
expect. A clear opportunity therefore exists for city-regions to enhance the design and 
effectiveness of this procedural accountability lever.  
In terms of democratic accountability mechanisms, although select committees and 
media coverage have on occasions made for uncomfortable moments for DWP ministers the 
effects are relatively short-term and modest. In terms of bottom-up user-led democratic 
accountability levers Work Programme does not attempt to enable participants to utilise 
 ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇůĞǀĞƌƐ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞmarket logics dominating programme design on the 
provider side. The limits of the MSGs constrain ƚŚĞƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ?ůĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚǇ-region 
schemes could think more ambitiously about how individuals might be empowered to use 
their agency to drive the quality and effectiveness of support, particularly via mechanisms to 
incorporate and utilise service user  ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ?Ğ ?Ő ?ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?
participant feedback ratings). 
Corporate governance levers apply in the form of contractually prescribed minimum 
performance levels (MPLs) that operate across key programme payment groups. These are 
used by DWP to make incentive payments for exceptional performance, terminate contracts 
for poor performance and shift referral volumes to better performing prime providers 
within CPAs. A key weakness of the original MPL measure was that its numerator (job 
outcomes within a set period) did not relate to the same individuals as its denominator 
(referrals within a set period), meaning that  ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ĐŽƵůĚ, other things 
equal, be  ‘ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚ ? simply by falling referral volumes over time, which has been the trend 
in practice over the lifetime of Work Programme. This has not only undermined the utility of 
these MPLs as a corporate-based accountability lever but has also led to DWP being 
contractually obliged to pay incentive payments in the face of performance concerns as well 
as facing difficulties in terminating contracts for the most concerning primes. Unsurprisingly, 
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the DWP have over time introduced an alternative MPL measure that was suggested to it at 
the outset by commentators based on the percentage of the cohort achieving a job 
outcome within twelve months. City-regions should adopt this cohort measure and should 
in addition give consideration to the inclusion of further intermediate targets around 
overcoming barriers and reducing the distance to paid work (as in the Greater Manchester 
Working Well employment support pilot) (GMCA, 2015) as well as to equity measures that 
compare performance between key sub-groups of interest (e.g. different types of claimants, 
different types of local labour markets). 
It is though market levers that represent the key accountability instrument of Work 
Programme in the form of a heavily (and since 2014 entirely) outcome focussed PbR model 
of differentiated payments across the nine payments groups. This is argued by the DWP to 
drive performance, to deliver value-for-money and to encourage providers to work 
responsively and in a highly personalised way with participants with diverse support needs 
and costs. Work Programme PbR is, however, now widely agreed to be an overly crude and 
badly calibrated PbR framework both in terms of the internal heterogeneity of the payment 
groups as well as in the levels and sequencing of its payments (Carter and Whitworth, 2015; 
Inclusion and NIACE, 2015). As a result this market accountability lever designs in rather 
than designs out perverse incentives ĨŽƌƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐƚŽƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐĂůůǇ ‘ĐƌĞĂŵ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚũŽď-
ready participants ĂŶĚ ‘ƉĂƌŬ ?ƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆďĂƌƌŝĞrs to work (Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015; WPSC, 2015). Starved of cash, acutely aware of risk around spend, and 
focused on short-term outcomes to trigger payments, prime providers have pursued risk-
minimising cost-reduction strategies to profit. There is evidence consistent with the 
 ‘ƉĂƌŬŝŶŐ ?ŽĨŵŽƌĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐindividuals and scant use of referrals to more specialist or 
intensive services (Newton et al., 2012; Meagher et al., 2014). For harder-to-help 
participants a downwards spiral of underfunding, poor performance and vulnerability to 
 ‘ƉĂƌŬŝŶŐ ?ŚĂs been the result (Inclusion and NIACE, 2015). In response, city-regions have the 
opportunity to recalibrate the PbR design in order to convert the incentive framework facing 
providers from one facilitating  ‘ƉĂƌŬŝŶŐ ?ƚŽŽŶĞŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀŝƐŝŶŐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ. It is now widely 
accepted that the payments profile for harder-to-help participants should include a stable 
up-front attachment or service fee of around 20%-30% of the total payment profile (WPSC, 
2015) and there is little evidence to suggest that on-going sustainment payments have 
brought value in terms of in-work support to those who have moved into work (Meager et 
al., 2014). Re-weighting the payments profile in this way would help both to de-risk and 
increase up-front investment in harder-to-help individuals in order to support them over the 
main hurdle of initial entry into paid work whilst at the same time helping to squeeze far 
more value from the same financial spend.  
 
Positively networked employment support, and the unique potential of city-regions to 
deliver it 
 
There is then much that city-regions can improve in their localised employment 
support programmes in response to clear and significant weaknesses in Work Programme ?Ɛ 
accountability mechanisms across these four procedural, democratic, corporate and market 
accountability spaces. Although the shoring up of these mechanisms as they are currently 
conceived is necessary to support harder-to-help participants, we suggest that such 
revisions are unable, in themselves, to be sufficient in unlocking the qualitatively and 
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quantitatively different services required to adequately support those with more complex 
and/or severe support needs.  
Instead, the currently nationally neglected network accountability lever becomes the 
key, game-changing accountability lever. Moreover, key to understanding the nature of the 
employment support system that is required in order to effectively support those with more 
complex and/or severe barriers to work is our introduction to the literature for the first time 
of a conceptual distinction beƚǁĞĞŶǁŚĂƚǁĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĞĂĐŚ
of these accountability levers that is currently absent within a literature that ignores and, 
arguably more dangerously, inappropriately homogenizes these distinct visions and 
approaches to these five accountability dimensions. Introducing this conceptual distinction 
to the literature enables for the first time the recognition that it is specifically the  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇ ?
conceived vision of this network accountability that is the key to enabling enhanced 
employment support for individuals with more complex and/or severe barriers to 
employment, and that city-regions are uniquely able to deliver this positive network 
accountability in their employment programmes. 
Hence, and stepping back ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĨŽĐƵƐĨŽƌĂŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?we support 
the need to move beyond analytically over-simplistic depictions of employment support 
systems in terms of singular accountability dimensions and to progress instead towards far 
greater attention to accountability hybridity within these complex systems (Jantz et al., 
2015). More fully, however, we argue that the required sensitivity to accountability 
hybridity must incorporate not only the constellations of, and interactions between, 
different accountability dimensions but, critically, must also include sensitivity to the distinct 
conceptual forms that those dimensions can take as well as the related spatial scales at 
which they do, can, and (in terms of their effectiveness) ought to operate. Hence, in order to 
understand the complexities of employment support systems not only does the study of 
accountability need to develop analytically to understand hybridity across the five 
accountability dimensions, but it must do so whilst taking more seriously the complex multi-
scalar interactions between conceptually distinct forms of those accountability levers. 
Table 1 below summarises the conceptual distinction between our proposed 
 ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝǀĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ. 
Whilst introduced to the accountability literature here for the first time, the conceptual 
origins of this distinction can be traced to a similar distinction made within classic works of 
political philosophy between negative/positive liberty (Berlin, 1969). For Berlin, negative 
liberty refers to the absence of constraints on an individual within an area (e.g. set of 
activities) in which subjects are considered to warrant the ability to do or be as they wish 
without interference from others. In contrast, positive liberty relates to the presence of 
control or self-ŵĂƐƚĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ
vision of themselves and their life and to themselves have the ability to self-direct towards 
those self-defined aims. In terms of their usage for us within our two visions of negative and 
positive accountability levers within employment support policies, the  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶs of 
these five accountability dimensions emphasise efficiency and risk-minimisation and seek to 
minimise undesirable behaviours and outcomes more than they seek to maximise desirable 
behaviours and outcomes. Hence, as with negative liberty, negative accountability levers 
focus defensively on downside protections and mitigations against undue risk exposure, 
potentially losing possible opportunities to maximise desirable behaviours and outcomes on 
the upside ?/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇdimensions 
focus progressively on upside ambitions around equity, opportunity-maximisation and self-
This is a Green Open Access post-print version of a forthcoming 2017 article accepted for publication 
in Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 
 
realisation over concerns of efficiency or risk-minimisation. They therefore focus more on 
seeking to maximise desirable behaviours and outcomes on the upside more than 
minimizing undesirable behaviours and outcomes on the downside, potentially introducing 
some additional risks and costs into the system in the process.  
 
Table 1: Heuristic typology of negative and positive conceptualisations of 
accountability dimensions 
 
 
 
Negative version of 
accountability mechanism seen 
in Work Programme 
Positive version of accountability 
mechanism 
Procedural Minimum Service Guarantees Maximum service guarantees 
Corporate Minimum performance levels 
(MPLs)  focused narrowly on 
triggering employment / earnings 
outcomes and progression 
irrespective of well-being 
Minimum performance levels 
(MPLs)  focused broadly on 
progression towards, and then 
progression in, quality work that 
supports well-being  
Market PbR incentivizing cost-cutting and 
 ‘ƉĂƌŬŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĚƌŝǀĞƉƌŽĨŝƚ 
PbR incentivizing innovation, risk-
taking and universal support to 
drive profit 
Democratic Top-down ministerial 
responsibilization; participant 
complaints process  
Bottom-up service user co-
production in design and 
management 
Network Merlin supply chain management Local Integration Boards 
 
 
As the discussion in the previous section has outlined, Table 1 highlights the 
dominance of negative accountability visions within the UK Work Programme across the 
procedural, corporate, market and democratic accountability dimensions, though it fails to 
convey the design weaknesses and imbalanced reliance on the market accountability lever. 
The key focus here however relates to the nationally neglected network accountability 
dimension, and in particular the transformative potential of its positive configuration.  
Focusing on this network accountability dimension, Work Programme once again 
displays a negative version of this lever in the form of the Merlin standard applied to prime 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚĂŝŵƐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƐŵĂůůĞƌƐƵď-prime 
organisations from exploitation by their overarching prime provider. It is a moot point to 
what extent Merlin has been able to realise this aim. Merlin has not in practice been able to 
prevent the well-capitalized primes from cascading down significant financial risk to their 
sub-primes by simply passing down the same heavily, and then fully, outcome-based PbR 
terms that the DWP intended to be borne only by primes via the inclusion during 
procurement of a £20 million turnover threshold in relation to primes, but not to sub-primes 
(Lane et al., 2013:35; Foster et al., 2014:128-130). More fundamentally, the supply chains 
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submitted by primes during the procurement process have in many ways not actually come 
to exist in practice. Primes have not referred participants to specialist providers in the 
volumes expected, or have disproportionately referred the most complex (and expensive) 
cases, starving smaller sub-prime organisations of referrals and of income flows (Meager et 
al., 2013; Foster et al., 2014). Where referrals have occurred there is evidence to suggest 
that they have been driven more by primes looking for low or no cost services (often outside 
of their supply chain) rather than more appropriate, specialist or intensive services (Newton 
et al., 2012).   
Network accountability inside the Work Programme has therefore embodied 
another negatively configured version of this accountability dimension, and has at that 
failed to mitigate the downside risks and perversities that it was designed to control. 
Irrespective of its efficacy or otherwise this Work Programme approach to network 
accountability is a fundamentally negative version that never had even the potential to 
deliver the type of integrated holistic employment support that harder-to-help participants 
require as this can only be created via a positive version of this same network accountability 
lever. This positively configured network accountability vision instead recognises that its key 
function for the effective support these individuals is to create and dynamically maintain a 
co-ordinated and integrated employment support ecosystem. That is, a system comprising 
all of the holistic wrap-around services required to respond effectively to the varied set of 
barriers faced by this group  W employment support, health, skills, housing, advice services, 
debt advice, food and energy security, and so on. The emerging city-region employment 
model can best be described in this way as the co-ordinated development of an 
employment support ecosystem of integrated services and budgets that are bent into, and 
wrapped around, participants and their keyworkers in the pursuit of sustained employment 
objectives.  
Central government clearly recognizes the need for locally integrated employment 
support ecosystems of this type, as seen in its creation of the joint Work and Health Unit 
(WHU) between the DWP and Department of Health centrally and its collaborative working 
with city-regions around the development of health-led employment trials ?tW ?ƐƉƵƐŚĨŽƌ
service integration and co-location within its Universal Support policy, or Work and Pensions 
Select Committee recommendations and Government responses (WPSC, 2015). They are 
right to do so.  
However, neither policymakers nor the academic community have yet acknowledged 
that the pursuit of such city-level policies necessitate far greater attention to the 
development of the positively networked accountability dimension. This in turn this requires 
the creation and on-going maintenance of new formalised governance arrangements to 
bring it about and it is this that brings significant geographical implications around the 
optimal  W indeed necessary  W local spatial scale at which this must be cultivated. For with 
the exception of the positively configured approach to network accountability all negative 
and positive conceptualisations of all five accountability dimensions can in principle be 
delivered by any geographical scale.  
Crucially, however, the type of positive network accountability key to the effective 
employment support for those with more complex and/or severe barriers to work can only 
be delivered at local scales for it is only at local scales that the strategic visioning, senior 
decision-making powers and operational responsibilities over the range of key wraparound 
supports reside.  These new local governance structures to facilitate precisely this type of 
positively networked accountability  W Local Integration Boards (LIBs) as they are coming to 
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be named  W are embryonically appearing across city-regions as they take forwards their 
Devolution Deal employment support pilot items. These LIBs perform the key function of 
bringing together key stakeholders from the various wraparound support systems involved 
(mental and physical health providers and commissioners, colleges, housing services, 
benefits advice, financial and debt advice, Jobcentre Plus colleagues, etc). They provide a 
formalised governance mechanism to enable both senior strategic commitment to the on-
going dynamic local processes of gradually increasing strategic system alignment and, where 
appropriate, integration (e.g. of objectives, delivery, procurement, budgeting, referrals, co-
location, culture change, etc). They also provide an operational forum for co-case 
management of individual complex cases in order to join up keyworkers with a whole-
person holistic support package with the range of multiple wraparound support services 
that their participants with more complex and/or severe barriers to work variously require 
but that remain disconnected without the concerted effort, coordination and formalised 
governance of LIBs at local scales.    
Whilst it is clear for these reasons that the formation of employment support 
ecosystems is by necessity a local project, there is however a debate to be had about 
whether the optimal scale is that of the city-region or, rather, that of the constituent and 
smaller local authority (municipality) administrative unit that in the English context is the 
mainstay of local political power and activity. Both are in principle possible and the model 
that is emerging currently across the city-regions at the forefront of this activity (Greater 
Manchester, London, Sheffield City Region) is a sensible hybrid of the two scales in which LIB 
governance arrangements are formed at local authority level and with city-region Combined 
Authorities acting as the key co-ordinating layer at which overarching programme design, 
procurement, and performance management occur. The formation of LIBs at local authority 
levels in this way reflects both their strong political identity and the extensive organisation 
of staff, services, budgets and governance at this well-established scale. However, rather 
than rely solely on single local authorities as the scale at which to build locally integrated 
employment support ecosystems, Combined Authorities offer a sensible overarching 
coordinating scale for its development across its several constituent local authorities. This is 
in part a reflection of the current political reality that it is at city-region and not local 
authority scale that central government negotiate devolution with localities, a situation 
likely to be reinforced by the imminent arrival of elected mayors with new ambitions and 
mandates across key city-regions. City-regions also offer an appropriate scale economically 
and geographically. Economically city-region geographies are built around the footprint of 
functional economic areas, often containing one (or more) urban core(s) and multiple 
surrounding areas, with strong commuter travel flows within that geography. This functional 
economic area offers a suitable geography from which to approach labour market policies 
such as these. This is particularly so when noting the centrality of demand-side as well as 
supply-side strategies in modern activation policies, especially in relation to people with 
more complex and/or severe barriers to employment. Finally, although generally not 
perfectly coterminous, city-region boundaries present stronger coterminosity than do local 
authorities to key Jobcentre Plus district boundaries and this facilitates the simplicity and 
effectiveness of their necessarily collaboration within any localised employment activity.   
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City-region employment support ecosystems and the lurching development of 
neoliberalism  
 
The analysis of ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ emerging city-region employment support ecosystems 
through the new lens of differentiated positive and negative accountability presents 
important insights to our understanding of city-region governance and employment support 
accountability frameworks as well as to the creation of transformative policy opportunities 
for the type of employment support that is able to be delivered for individuals with complex 
and/or severe needs. The analytical result is a clearer recognition of what is needed to 
ĚĞůŝǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŵƵĐŚ-needed step-change in employment support programmes, 
experiences and performance for people with more severe and/or complex barriers to work 
(positively networked employment support ecosystems), why it is needed (integrated and 
adequately resourced services and budgets for whole-person holistic support), how it can be 
brought about (formalised and dynamic local governance frameworks to create and 
maintain multi-system strategic and operational alignment and coordination), and who in a 
geographic sense is uniquely able to deliver it (city-regions working in collaboration with 
local authorities, not central government). 
For those of a centre-left disposition these emerging positively networked city-
region employment support ecosystem models offer a version of employment support that 
may be both markedly more progressive and more effective for those with complex needs 
compared with a lean national offer in which average duration of advisor meetings is around 
four minutes. The DWP spend on employment support is around a quarter to a third of the 
share of GDP that comparable OECD nations spend (Eurostat, 2016), and an already lean 
DWP departmental budget is estimated to fall by 45% between 2010 and 2020 (Resolution 
Foundation, 2015).  
The progressivity of these specific shifts towards localised employment support 
ecosystems in countering the significant failings of the WoƌŬWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ƐŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů
approach to quasi-marketized employment support, however, also depends critically on the 
broader context within which these localised schemes operate. Work on neoliberalism 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚŝƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂ “ƌĂƐĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ? ?Weck and Theodore, 2012: 178) but 
also that it is a highly malleable and resilient project that thrives off its own crises such that 
ŝƚ “ĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐĂůƵƌĐŚŝŶŐĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ?ŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇĨĂŝůƵƌĞĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀŝƐĞĚĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(ibid: 178). Unlike its lofty, unrealistic textbook accounts, neoliberalism in practice survives 
ďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŝƚƐ “ƐŚĂƉĞ-ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ “ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƐƚŝĐŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŽƌŬĂƌŽƵŶĚƐ
and on-the-ŚŽŽĨƌĞĐĂůŝďƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƉŽůŝĐǇ-ŵĂŬĞƌƐ “ ‘ůĞĂŶŝŶƚŽ ?ĐƌŝƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?
extemporising  ‘ĚŽǁŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐŝŶƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐĚŝƐĂƌƌĂǇ ?ďƵƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞŶƵĚŐŝŶŐ
the programme of liberalisation-cum-ĚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŽŶĂǌŝŐǌĂŐŐŝŶŐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?ŝďŝĚ P
179). In this vein, it can also be argued on two dimensions that that from the performance 
crisis of the negative neoliberalism of the national Work Programme comes a rescaled 
localised masterstroke for that same neoliberal paradigm of employment support rather 
than any fundamental progressive reconfiguration of it.  
An initial dimension of consideration is the broader context of ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ spatially 
unequal economy within which city-region employment support schemes occupy particular 
geographical pockets  W some economically buoyant, some far less so. Exacerbating those 
long-standing spatial inequalities in recent years has been the public sector budget cuts 
resulting from the central government policy decision of on-going austerity, an approach 
ƐŽĨƚĞŶĞĚƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĂĨƚĞƌ'ĞŽƌŐĞKƐďŽƌŶĞ ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ role of Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer. Whilst it is the case that devolution creates opportunities for city-regions to 
work smarter and do more with less by better integrating and aligning local services and 
budgets, the viability of these potential efficiencies is inevitably balanced against the 
dramatically ƐŚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŽƚĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ?ĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?
real spending per person has been cut by around 23% and with further cuts planned the 
total reduction between 2010 and 2020 is estimated to be 37% in real terms (LGA, 
2015b:11). In this challenging fiscal context, whilst there are important ways in which city-
regions can drive economic growth in their areas they are reliant on supportive underlying 
macro-level trends that are largely beyond their control but that are integral to providing 
the economic potential with which their city-region levers can interact.  
Thus, whilst the rescaling of employment support to city-region level may well be 
necessary to effectively support harder-to-help participants, there is also a risk that such 
localisation may further embed, as well as legitimise politically, already existing patterns of 
spatial inequality due to the tendency for devolution to unrealistically reposition city-
regions as autonomous areas abstracted from broader macro-level structural patterns down 
to which regressively containerised economic risk and responsibility can be dumped by 
central government (Peck, 2002, 2012; Etherington and Jones, 2009). Work on austerity 
cities in the US context (Peck, 2012) conveys powerfully the socio-spatially regressive path 
that such a route of unrealistic economic containerisation might create for English city-
regions in the future. Concerning in this regard in the English context is a notable inversion 
within central government framing of devolution from a logic of redistribution to one where 
poorer regions are instead portrayed increasingly as a millstone around the neck of more 
prosperous southern areas (Etherington and Jones, 2009).  
A second key dimension in need of consideration for a rounded assessment of the 
progressivity of these city-region schemes relates to conversations around their 
particularised  W albeit softened  W adoption of the same neoliberal paradigm of employment 
support. Within city-region ecosystem models of employment support quasi-marketization 
and PbR continue to operate, although  W and importantly  W with a higher weighting towards 
supporting all participants and secure up-front attachment payments when compared to 
the national Work Programme model. Crucially, however, these  ‘ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?payments are 
received only by the contracted-out prime provider supplying the keyworkers at the heart of 
the model. In terms of the city-region wrap-around integrated infrastructure of support 
services  W health, skills, advice services, housing, and so on  W it is city-ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵĚŐĞƚƐĂŶĚ
systems that are bent around those primes to enable them to more effectively trigger 
outcome payments for local unemployed residents. Those wider systems receive none of 
the outcome payments, justified  W in part reasonably  W by the expected budget savings and 
reductions in demand for those wraparound services within their own systems as result of 
these positive employment outcomes.  
To be sure, the type of neoliberal employment support model seen within these 
emerging city-ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞƐŝƐƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇƐŽĨƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞtW ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚto 
contracted-out provision as depicted in the Work Programme and the expectations around 
the future Work and Health Programme. Yet at heart city-region rescaling tweaks rather 
than fundamentally reconfigures the now widespread neoliberal paradigm of employment 
support that has strong traction with DWP policy makers, despite the traceability of the city-
region scalar fix back to the significant shortcomings of that neoliberal employment support 
paradigm as seen in Work Programme as well as in the broader international evidence base 
(van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; van Berkel et al., 2011; de 
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Graaf and Sirovatka, 2012). Instead, ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐŐƌŝƉŽŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ employment support 
landscape can in some ways be argued to be further embedded, buttressed and indeed 
subsidised through these devolutionary programmes, despite their transformative 
progressive intent and potential. For in seeking locally progressive alternatives within the 
ideological and political constraints in which these devolutionary negotiations take place 
city-regions inject new resources (both in-kind services and cash), new governance 
frameworks (for service co-ordination and performance oversight) and new logics 
(relationships, trust and care in the positive network accountability vision) as they seek to 
both better protect and better support harder-to-help individuals from the acknowledged 
shortcomings of the neoliberal employment support framework.  
Yet they do not fundamentally step beyond it, at least not in this early wave of 
devolutionary employment support activity. Thus, if localisation of employment support to 
city-regions has been described as a scalar fix to the problems of the neoliberal paradigm of 
employment support then it is perhaps far from clear whether the fix is more for 
unemployed programme participants or for that underlying neoliberal project. The question 
for progressive scholars and city-region policy makers is whether the internal contradictions 
of the resulting city-region employment support model are worth bearing in order to better 
support their unemployed citizens who face more significant barriers to work.  
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